Disengaged Buddhism by Lele, Amod
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
ISSN 1076-9005 
http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/ 
Volume 26, 2019 
 
 
 
 
Disengaged Buddhism 
 
Amod Lele 
Boston University 
 
 
 
Copyright Notice: Digital copies of this work may be made and distributed 
provided no change is made and no alteration is made to the content. 
Reproduction in any other format, with the exception of a single copy 
for private study, requires the written permission of the author. All en-
quiries to: vforte@albright.edu. 

  
 
 
 
Disengaged Buddhism 
 
Amod Lele 1 
 
Abstract 
Contemporary engaged Buddhist scholars typically claim ei-
ther that Buddhism always endorsed social activism, or that 
its non-endorsement of such activism represented an un-
witting lack of progress. This article examines several clas-
sical South Asian Buddhist texts that explicitly reject social 
and political activism. These texts argue for this rejection 
on the grounds that the most important sources of suffer-
ing are not something that activism can fix, and that politi-
cal involvement interferes with the tranquility required for 
liberation. The article then examines the history of en-
gaged Buddhism in order to identify why this rejection of 
activism has not yet been taken sufficiently seriously. 
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Introduction2 
In a chapter entitled “All Buddhism Is Engaged,” Patricia Hunt-Perry and 
Lyn Fine quote Thich Nhat Hanh as follows: “‘Buddhism is already en-
gaged Buddhism. If it is not, it is not Buddhism.’”3 (Hunt-Perry and Fine 
36) What does this quote actually mean? Hunt-Perry and Fine do not 
spell it out. It could be a simple tautology: by “engaged Buddhism” we 
simply mean “Buddhism,” such that a forest monk who refuses all con-
tact with society counts as an engaged Buddhist. Such an approach 
would be entirely unhelpful; for, in that case, there would be no need to 
speak of “engaged Buddhism” rather than simply of Buddhism, and to do 
so would merely confuse the issue. 
 More commonly, “engaged Buddhism” is used as a shorthand for 
socially engaged Buddhism, a Buddhism that embraces social and political 
activism. Hunt-Perry and Fine themselves use the term this way. If “en-
gaged Buddhism” is indeed understood in this way, then the quote could 
                                                        
2 For comments on various versions of this article I would like to thank Eyal Aviv, Don-
na Brown, Jason Clower, Charles Goodman, April Hughes, Christopher Ives, Stephen 
Jenkins, Sallie King, David McMahan, Richard Nance, David Nowakowski, Ryan Overbey, 
Dagmar Schwerk, Julia Stenzel, Tanya Storch, Jayadvaita Swami, multiple anonymous 
reviewers, and the members of Boston University’s extremely helpful CURA forum on 
social engagement, especially Daryl Ireland, Tim Longman and Larry Whitney. Thanks 
also to Justin McDaniel for providing an early draft of his work, and to Alan Wagner for 
a comment to the Harvard Asian Religions Colloquium, circa 2005, which was the origi-
nal provocation for the ideas of this article.  
3 It is not clear to me whether Thich Nhat Hanh ever made this statement, although he 
has said some similar things. Hunt-Perry and Fine put the phrase in quotation marks, 
and in their bibliography they say “see” Nhat Hanh’s Love in Action. They provide no 
page reference for the quote; and, as far as I can tell, the phrase never actually appears 
in that book. That concern is not my focus here, however. It reflects an attitude current 
among many Western Buddhists; whether or not Nhat Hanh ever actually spoke these 
words, one can find Hunt-Perry and Fine’s citation of him itself widely cited on the In-
ternet.  
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 241 
 
 
mean one of two things. It could be a factual claim that everyone prac-
tising Buddhism has, in fact, been socially engaged, or it could be a nor-
mative definition that says self-identified Buddhists who are not socially 
engaged are not truly Buddhist.  
 The factual claim that everyone practising Buddhism has been 
socially engaged is false. For in fact many revered Buddhist thinkers 
have not merely refrained from social engagement, they have actively 
discouraged it. As a consequence, the normative definition is far more 
exclusionary than Hunt-Perry and Fine would likely want it to be.  
 I refer to the Buddhism of these thinkers as disengaged Buddhism.4 
Disengaged Buddhists, in this sense, reject involvement with social and 
political issues as unfruitful and even harmful. I intend no negative con-
notation to the term “disengaged.”5 In colloquial conversation, when a 
friend is involved in conflict surrounding other acquaintances that has 
negative emotional effects, we might give that friend the helpful advice 
that “You need to disengage from that situation”—advice that, we will 
see, has an analogue among the positions of the disengaged Buddhists. 
 This article does not argue that a Buddhist disengaged view is 
correct. Rather, I argue that disengaged Buddhism is a coherent, 
thoughtful position to be found across a variety of at least classical Indi-
                                                        
4 A recent work of Justin McDaniel’s uses this term in a different way, referring to “lei-
sure—what I like to call socially disengaged Buddhism.” McDaniel identifies this leisure-
based Buddhism in contrast to the Buddhism usually studied by scholars, “monasteries 
and monks and the art they create and books they write . . . places defined by discipline 
and obligation” (McDaniel 14-15). He does not justify his usage of “disengaged” to refer 
to Buddhist leisure activities. I find the usage and contrast rather odd, since it is not 
clear from the context what makes monks and monasteries “socially engaged,” nor is 
that a way in which the term “engaged Buddhism,” or especially “socially engaged 
Buddhism,” is generally used. 
5 Such as the connotation that Thomas Yarnall takes it to have in his paper.  
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an Buddhist texts; as such, it deserves more constructive ethical atten-
tion than it has so far received. Western engaged Buddhist scholars, in 
particular, have typically given the claims of disengaged Buddhism in-
sufficient attention in two different ways: either they act as if it never 
existed, or they treat it as an unwitting lack, a vacuum to be filled. They 
have generally not taken it as a thoughtful position worthy of response 
and debate.  
 This article is a response to those Western scholars, because they 
occupy a very prominent place in the scholarly field of Buddhist ethics, 
especially constructive or normative Buddhist ethics. It is not in re-
sponse to Asian or other engaged Buddhist activists, who are outside this 
article’s purview. The aim of this article is not to critique what engaged 
Buddhists do (that would be a very different article), but how they think 
and write, especially about the Buddhist past. I am critiquing the scholar-
ship and advocacy, rather than the practice, of engaged Buddhism. 
 This article is in sympathy with James Deitrick’s claim that, to 
date at least, American “socially engaged Buddhist social ethics is de-
rived less from Buddhist sources than from the American religious cul-
ture in which it has grown” (i). It aims to go beyond Deitrick by examin-
ing those Buddhist sources and the positions they take in opposition to 
contemporary Western engaged Buddhist thought. I will present several 
texts from classical South Asia (roughly the eighth century CE and be-
fore) that directly discourage involvement in politics or other forms of 
activism, and I will explain the reasoning that underlies this discour-
agement. I have intentionally selected a broad range of texts from across 
the period in question—mainstream6 and Mahāyāna, narrative and phil-
                                                        
6 The term “mainstream Buddhism” is in widespread use among scholars of Indian 
Buddhism to refer to non-Mahāyāna traditions in a non-pejorative way. “Theravāda” is 
a narrower term, referring to one sub-tradition of mainstream Buddhism that emerged 
in Sri Lanka long after some of the texts discussed here. Although most Buddhists today 
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osophical—to highlight how widespread disengaged ideals were across 
this context.  
 I stick to this classical South Asian context to avoid losing focus, 
though disengaged Buddhist ideals extend beyond this context.7 I am not 
claiming that every Buddhist text from this period is disengaged in the 
sense I use here. Steven Collins acutely notes two “modes of dhamma” in 
the Pāli literature, one of which accommodates both politics and vio-
lence, and one of which resists them both (Nirvana 419-423). I am delib-
erately focusing on texts in the latter mode in order to highlight an as-
pect of classical South Asian Buddhism that has been unjustly neglected 
in contemporary Buddhist ethical reflection. Still, I hope that the wide 
variety of texts in this article shows that even if the disengaged tenden-
cy is not universal in classical Indian Buddhism, it is nevertheless wide-
spread—widespread enough that a normative definition of Buddhism as 
socially engaged would bar a wide variety of revered thinkers and texts 
as not truly Buddhist. 
 I will begin the article by articulating the ways in which engaged 
Buddhist scholars have so far approached historical Buddhist texts, not-
ing that those approaches take two different forms, though neither form 
has so far done justice to the positions the texts articulate. Next, I will 
introduce the classical texts at issue and explain the methodological rea-
sons why the claims of these texts matter. I will then show how these 
texts reject the idea that social engagement is a duty, and then explain 
their reasoning. Briefly, they claim that the significant sources of suffer-
                                                                                                                                          
are affiliated with Mahāyāna traditions, most in classical South Asia were not so affili-
ated.  
7 For example, recently Thanissaro Bhikkhu has constructively made some of the sorts 
of arguments I describe here as disengaged, with reference to some of the texts cited 
here. Later in the article we will also see Judith Simmer-Brown speaking of contempo-
rary Buddhist teachers who advocate disengaged Buddhism. 
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ing are not the sort that social engagement can address, and that politi-
cal participation is typically harmful to well-being.8 Finally, I will look at 
the history of engaged Buddhism to explore why disengaged Buddhism 
has so far been generally ignored.  
 
Engaged Buddhist Scholarship and the Buddhist Past 
The movement of engaged Buddhism is well-studied, in part because it 
includes many religion scholars among its members. They have offered a 
variety of definitions of engaged Buddhism, though not necessarily pre-
cise ones. One of them, Christopher Queen, identifies engaged Buddhism 
in terms of “energetic engagement with social and political issues and 
crises” (ix). Another term for this “engagement” is activism. Thomas 
Tweed identifies activism as “the concern to uplift individuals, reform 
societies, and participate energetically in the political and economic 
spheres” (xxiv). 
 Sallie King similarly says engaged Buddhism consists of Buddhists 
who “engage with the problems of their society—inclusive of political, 
social, economic, racial, gender, environmental, and other problems—on 
the basis of their Buddhist worldview, values, and spirituality” (“Prob-
lems” 166). Not explicitly included on this list are psychological or spir-
itual problems of craving, anger, and ignorance. A call for papers for a 
2000 conference on engaged Buddhism (published in JBE vol. 7) made 
that exclusion explicit, stating that engaged Buddhism is 
                                                        
8 Matthew Moore recognizes correctly that Buddhist texts often do not treat politics as 
an obligation, and therefore portrays the Buddhist tradition as one of “limited citizen-
ship” (Moore 87-111). However, he misses that many texts go further and actively por-
tray political engagement as bad and dangerous.  
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[c]haracterized by a reorientation of Buddhist soteriology 
and ethics to identify and address sources of human suf-
fering outside of the cravings and ignorance of the suffer-
er—such as social, political, and economic injustice, war-
fare, and violence, and environmental degradation. (qtd. 
in Jenkins 2000) 
 The political element of engaged Buddhism is particularly im-
portant. We may note first that all three definitions just quoted include 
the term “political.” I have not yet seen an engaged Buddhist article that 
defines “political,” but they seem to be in line with the definition pro-
posed by the political scientist Matthew Moore in his examination of 
Buddhist political theory, as having to do with government:  
I understand government to be the processes and institu-
tions either authorized to make or effectively capable of 
making binding decisions for a geographically bounded 
population, including the power to enforce those deci-
sions coercively. Politics, more broadly, is the set of prac-
tices and institutions that are concerned with the opera-
tion, staffing, maintenance, and possible modification of 
government, including the extreme of wanting to abolish 
government altogether or at least radically change it. (89-
90) 
 Thomas Freeman Yarnall’s examples of social engagement—
”voting, lobbying, peaceful protest, civil disobedience, and so forth” (1)—
are all political in this sense, of practices involved with government. 
Likewise, in looking for a historical exemplar or precursor of engaged 
Buddhism, many scholars turn to the figure of Aśoka/Asoka, the third-
century (BCE) emperor who united most of the Indian subcontinent un-
der his rule. Joanna Macy, for example, proclaims:  
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One of the great heroes of Buddhist tradition is King Aso-
ka, who in his devotion to Dharma built hospitals and pub-
lic wells and tree-lined roads for the ‘welfare of all beings.’ 
Historians recognize his efforts in the third century B.C.E. 
as the first public social service program in recorded his-
tory. (173)  
 The reasons that engaged Buddhist ethics urges activism vary, 
but they typically involve a conviction that ethical action requires the 
sort of systemic change that government can provide. As Main and Lai de-
scribe it, 
socially engaged reasoning recognizes action as moral on-
ly when it changes the nature of the social relations and 
situations that cause the other to experience pain, priva-
tion, and exclusion. From early in the twentieth century, 
this has meant systematic solutions and broad reform to 
properly address social problems. (24) 
It is conceptually crucial to distinguish social and political en-
gagement, in this sense of activism, from other different phenomena 
which are sometimes confused with it. First, as Queen (14-17) rightly 
notes, engagement is not at all the same thing as altruism, kindness, or 
compassion.9 Karuṇā and maitrī are praised throughout the Indian Bud-
                                                        
9 The way Queen himself employs the distinction does not quite reflect the way altruism 
works in many classical texts, as his examples of non-engaged altruism still involve 
material benefit: “nursing the sick, leading the blind, helping the down-trodden, feed-
ing those who are hungry, and providing lodging for those who are needy” (14) .For 
Śāntideva the paradigm altruistic activities are teaching others the dharma that will 
save them from suffering, as I discuss in “Ethical Revaluation,” “The Compassionate,” 
and later in this article. I cite Queen because he is right to notice that there is a distinc-
tion: classical advocates of compassion like Śāntideva and Candrakīrti are not advocat-
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dhist world, and they are particularly important for Mahāyāna Bud-
dhists. Mahāyāna Buddhists like Śāntideva take altruistic action as an 
essential part of the good life. But for several important Mahāyāna Bud-
dhists, neither karuṇā nor maitrī nor altruism implies social or political 
activism at all. We will see, indeed, that Śāntideva and Candrakīrti ex-
plicitly reject political engagement while nevertheless singing the praises 
of compassion and altruism. For them altruism and political engagement 
are entirely different from each other. 
 Nor is engagement identical with “living in the world,” with a life 
within saṃsāra that rejects the detachment of the forest monk. Contra 
Thich Nhat Hanh,10 living with one’s family as a Buddhist is not sufficient 
to make one an engaged Buddhist, if the term “engaged Buddhism” is to 
mean anything of significance at all. Classical texts on a householder’s 
conduct, like the Sigālovāda Sutta, do not indicate that a householder 
should address issues “inclusive of political, social, economic, racial, 
gender, environmental, and other problems.” They do not advocate po-
litical activism or systemic change, and so should not count as engaged 
Buddhism. Likewise, the altruism of Śāntideva and Candrakīrti requires 
them to engage with other people in society, but that engagement may 
well take the form of recommending those others reject political in-
volvement. 
 Engaged Buddhist scholars often claim that engagement with so-
cial and political problems (“outside of the cravings and ignorance of the 
                                                                                                                                          
ing the kind of political activism for systemic change pursued by engaged Buddhists. As 
we will see, in many respects they oppose it. 
10 In a 1989 lecture at First Unitarian Church in Houston, Texas, Nhat Hanh said “En-
gaged Buddhism is just Buddhism. If you practice Buddhism in your family, in society, it 
is engaged Buddhism” (White). Like the earlier “Buddhism is already engaged” quota-
tion, this quotation is often quoted without the original source, although in this case I 
was able to track it down.  
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sufferer”) is a duty, an obligation. Kenneth Kraft closes the Engaged Bud-
dhism in the West collection with these words:  
How best to respond to the plight of the world? The twen-
ty authors of this book concur unanimously on the first 
part of the answer:  
We must be engaged. (506) 
 Those last four words get their own paragraph, to emphasize the 
idea that social engagement is a duty, a necessity, something we must do. 
Engaged Buddhist writers often believe that something is wrong or lack-
ing with people or traditions who are not engaged in the ways specified.  
 The major point of disagreement among Western engaged Bud-
dhist scholars is about the extent to which the Buddhist past fits that de-
scription, of lacking a proper degree of engagement. It is a matter of 
some controversy among engaged Buddhist scholars whether engaged 
Buddhism, in fact, amounts to a reorientation of Buddhist ethics, as the 
2000 call for papers had proclaimed, or whether it was always present. 
 Yarnall helpfully distinguishes between two major orientations 
on this latter question. He refers to these as “traditionist” and “modern-
ist.” I agree with his assessment that these terms are not ideal, but they 
do serve present purposes, so I adopt them rather than attempting to 
coin further neologisms. 
 “Modernist” writers, in Yarnall’s sense, emphasize the disconti-
nuity of engaged Buddhism with the Asian Buddhist past. They assert 
that Buddhists in the past were not socially active, but they rarely treat 
that disengaged past as an intellectual opponent worthy of response and 
refutation. More commonly, they speak of that past as if it were an un-
witting lack, a primitive stage that Buddhists would have progressed be-
yond if they’d just thought about it enough. Gary Snyder argues that 
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“Historically, Buddhist philosophers have failed to analyze out the degree 
to which ignorance and suffering are caused or encouraged by social fac-
tors, considering fear-and-desire to be given facts of the human condi-
tion” (Snyder 82). Sallie King says that a concern for individual spiritual 
growth “has tended, especially in some sects like Zen, to retard the devel-
opment of an attitude that more energetically embraces social activism as 
a good thing” (King, “Social Engagement” 167). George Tanabe similarly 
identifies traditional Buddhist philosophy’s refusal to engage with politi-
cal concerns as a sign of premodern Buddhism’s lack of advancement:  
Whereas Buddhists throughout the ages have been in-
volved with society, their development of a social and po-
litical philosophy has not been as advanced as their teach-
ings on inner spirituality. Engaged Buddhism arises from 
and responds to this vacuum . . . (Editor’s preface to King, 
Benevolence, ix; emphases added to all quotes) 
 By contrast “traditionists,” like Yarnall, often see modernist ideas 
of “advancement” beyond a “vacuum” as disrespectful to the existing 
Asian Buddhist past. However, not only do the traditionists give disen-
gaged Buddhism no intellectual consideration, they deny that it was 
widespread or even that it existed. So Yarnall says his traditionist “group 
of scholars maintains that Buddhists have never accepted a dualistic split 
between ‘spiritual’ and ‘social’ domains. To engage in the spiritual life 
necessarily includes (though it cannot be reduced to) social engagement” 
(4; emphasis added). 
 Traditionist scholars often cite textual evidence from classical 
Indian Buddhism to support their position. Stephen Jenkins argues that 
in traditional texts, “in order to create the conditions necessary for ben-
efiting people spiritually, one must first attend to their material needs.” 
He claims that in the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta, “Material well-being is a 
prerequisite for moral development, and its absence leads to social disas-
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ter.” Likewise, Joanna Macy invokes Bodhicaryāvatāra chapter VIII’s fa-
mous arguments for altruism in order to claim that Śāntideva “saw ser-
vice to others as the path leading to enlightenment . . .” (Macy 173) 
 I dispute both the traditionist and modernist engaged interpreta-
tions of classical Indian Buddhism. Against the traditionists, rejections of 
social and political activity were widespread among Indian Buddhist 
thinkers, including in some texts that the traditionists take as examples 
of engagement. The modernists are an interpretive step up from most 
traditionists in that they recognize how often premodern Buddhism was 
disengaged; what they rarely acknowledge is the thoughtful reasoning 
underlying that disengagement.  
 
Method in Buddhist Ethics 
Engaged Buddhist scholarship occupies both descriptive and normative 
ground, and I take this to be a good thing. However, such Buddhist nor-
mative ethics needs to respond to classical Buddhist claims it disagrees 
with, such as disengaged Buddhist claims.  
 Kenneth Kraft notes that there is a potential ambiguity in the 
term “engaged Buddhist studies:” although it can mean simply the study 
of engaged Buddhism without any commitment to it, it nevertheless also 
“suggests approaches that incorporate personal religious beliefs, politi-
cal commitments, or other forms of involvement” (79). It is easy to see 
that engaged Buddhist scholarship in practice takes such normative ap-
proaches frequently. Kraft’s own “we must be engaged” is an obvious 
example. Sallie King, likewise, often claims in her works that they are 
written “from the perspective of engaged Buddhism” (“Social Engage-
ment” 179n3; “Response” 638). Even the works of King’s that do not ex-
plicitly proclaim a normative perspective nevertheless implicitly take it 
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up, such as when she proclaims that “it is easy to take expressions of 
contempt and acts of violence as criteria for discerning what is not a val-
id expression of the Dharma” and uses explicitly normative language of 
“at best” and “at worst” to describe various forms of Buddhist political 
expression (Socially 25-26). Franz-Johannes Litsch introduces a descrip-
tion of German engaged Buddhism by proclaiming: “To practice engaged 
Buddhism is to unlock the deepest potential of persons, to serve others, 
and to become enlightened” (423). Brian Victoria (“Skeleton” 72) pro-
claims that “I personally am a strong supporter of this movement” (i.e. 
engaged Buddhism). Acknowledging his status as a fully ordained Zen 
priest (Zen xiii), he then declares it a “glaring deficiency” of his second 
edition that it “fails to address the question of how Japanese institutional 
Buddhism, most especially Zen, can be restored to its rightful place as an 
authentic expression of the Buddha Dharma” (Zen 232). These examples 
of engaged Buddhist scholars’ normative commitments could easily be 
extended. 
 Importantly, Kraft says of this ambiguity in “engaged Buddhist 
studies” that “perhaps it is a welcome one” (79). I agree with Kraft on 
this point. When done well, normative engaged Buddhist scholarship can 
help to fill the unfortunate “void” identified by José Cabezón (27) “in the 
triangle between a) purely descriptive philology, b) uncritical tradition-
alism and c) uncritical popular literature.”  
 Such a void is created when Buddhist or other theological or con-
structive concerns are considered to have no place in scholarship. David 
Chappell (371), for example, recommends that his conclusions’ “validity 
and usefulness now need to be measured by trying to apply them as a 
guide for various ethical decisions. But perhaps this is a task for Bud-
dhists rather than scholars”—as if somehow one could not be both. 
When one assumes that scholarship is not Buddhist and Buddhism is not 
scholarly, one limits and deprives both of them.  
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 Chappell makes no argument for this separation of Buddhism 
from scholarship; in my experience, such a separation is typically more 
assumed than argued. There have been some scholars of religion who 
have argued for it, most notably Donald Wiebe. Wiebe argues that uni-
versity scholarship must be “scientific,” which in his view requires a 
commitment to “description, analysis and explanation” alone, not her-
meneutic interpretation or the dissemination of social or cultural values. 
(95) But such a criterion would rule out not only the entire discipline of 
philosophy, but the normative dimensions of political theory and of 
fields like gender studies, literature, and art. Wiebe frequently attacks 
“humanists” (112-113, 281, 286), so he seems to accept this implication; 
but it seems unlikely to me that Chappell and most others who would 
make such claims in Buddhist ethics are willing to do so.  
 Nor should they. The separation of “scholars” from “Buddhists” 
leaves no room for scholars to do Buddhist ethics, only to study other 
people’s Buddhist ethical beliefs. If Buddhist ethical scholarship were to 
be limited in that way, it would be analogous to limiting biologists to the 
study of other people’s beliefs about biology without their ever making 
any biological claims of their own. The scholarly field of Buddhist ethics 
needs to include normative ethical work. Yet typically scholars have 
been too timid to include it; thus, even when Damien Keown expresses 
the genuine need for Buddhist ethics to move “beyond simple descrip-
tive ethics,” he still moves only to a descriptive meta-ethics, explicitly 
avoiding normative ethics (3, 6). Keown’s approach is striking since the 
study of ethics, from Aristotle’s coining of the term onward, has been an 
overwhelmingly normative discipline—as one would expect, since, for 
most people studying ethics over the centuries, normatively identifying 
how human beings should live has been the point.  
 It is, then, an enormous virtue of the field of engaged Buddhist 
studies that it has often avoided such an impoverished, merely descrip-
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tive, view of Buddhist ethics: engaged Buddhist studies has aimed to ar-
ticulate what is good and bad for us Buddhists to do, not merely what 
others have said about the topic; and it has done so within a scholarly 
context.  
 What engaged Buddhist ethics has not yet had is sufficient rigor 
in defending its constructive ethical claims—a task central to making any 
claims that one makes as a scholar. A key difference between biology and 
Buddhist ethics is that, in the latter, descriptive historical and sociologi-
cal claims are directly relevant to constructive and normative claims. 
Most engaged Buddhist scholars make normative inferences from some 
Buddhist texts; they agree that the question of whether the texts or the 
Buddha said something is relevant to whether it is true or should be 
adopted. But once one agrees with that premise, then one must take se-
riously the claims of those other Buddhist texts that disagree. Many en-
gaged Buddhists would take texts addressed in this article as canonical; 
indeed, some of them, such as the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta and Śāntide-
va’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, are among the very texts that engaged Buddhist 
scholars typically quote. Therefore, it is critical for engaged Buddhist 
scholars to confront the disengaged arguments made in those texts, as to 
date they have not. As Cabezón notes, the norms of scholarly humanistic 
discourse require “breadth of analysis,” which  
implies that no source will be dismissed in an ad hoc 
manner. I take such a commitment to imply a willingness 
to grapple with what, from a contemporary perspective, 
might be considered the most problematic and anachro-
nistic portions of the tradition. (35) 
 Brian Victoria’s Zen at War and the recent works of Stephen Jen-
kins (“On the Auspiciousness,” “Making Merit”) have been exemplary in 
this regard. Victoria and Jenkins have shown how wide swaths of Bud-
dhist tradition have argued for violence and war in the name of the 
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dharma. They have done an excellent job of bringing engaged Buddhists 
face-to-face with parts of the tradition (including revered texts and 
thinkers) that argue for a politics contrary to contemporary engaged 
Buddhist scholars’ ideals. Considerably less “grappling” has so far oc-
curred with those elements of Buddhist tradition that contradict con-
temporary engaged Buddhists in urging their audiences not to partici-
pate in politics at all.  
 In the sections to follow, I will show the claims of these disen-
gaged Buddhists using an intentionally wide variety of classical Indian 
Buddhist texts. The earliest texts at issue here come from the Pāli Canon 
(Tipiṭaka), a collection dating from the first Buddhist millennium and 
still held sacred by contemporary Theravāda Buddhists. The Pāli texts 
cited here include several suttas (discourses of the Buddha) and the 
Mūgapakkha Jātaka, one of the Ten Great Jātakas (the stories of the Bud-
dha’s ten last births before his final birth as Gotama Buddha).  
 I also include Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita (Acts of the Buddha, abbre-
viated BC), a famous Sanskrit courtly poem (kāvya) from approximately 
the first century CE, which recounts the Buddha’s life story and is con-
sidered authoritative in China as well as India (Li). To demonstrate that 
the disengaged Buddhist approach is found in Mahāyāna as well as main-
stream (“Hīnayāna”) sources, I also refer to the seventh- and eighth-cen-
tury Mahāyāna Madhyamaka philosophers Śāntideva and Candrakīrti. 
On the latter I refer specifically to Śāntideva’s two major works, the Bo-
dhicaryāvatāra (BCA) and Śikṣāsamuccaya (ŚS), and to Candrakīrti’s Catuḥ-
śatakaṭīkā (CŚṬ), a commentary on the Catuḥśataka (CŚ) verses by the ear-
lier Madhyamaka philosopher Āryadeva. These Madhyamaka works were 
all composed in Sanskrit, though the CŚ/CŚṬ is now only extant in Tibet-
an.  
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Is Engagement a Duty? 
Against Yarnall’s claim that “the spiritual path necessarily includes . . . 
social engagement” or Kraft’s claim that “we must be engaged,” several 
classical Indian texts explicitly reject involvement with social and politi-
cal issues. Let us first consider first the figure of the cakravartin (in San-
skrit, cakkavatti in Pāli), the ideal “wheel-turning” ruler. When a 
cakravartin is the head of state, many classical texts claim, his society is 
uplifted tremendously for the better. The Lakkhana Sutta proclaims that 
his polity will be “a land open, uninfested by brigands, free from jungle, 
powerful, prosperous, happy and free from perils” (DN III.146). He even 
has the power to “end all strife” (DN III.173). The act of becoming a 
cakravartin enables one to create a world where social systems are per-
fected, idyllic. 
 Becoming a cakravartin is something that every buddha is capa-
ble of doing—and yet every buddha decides not to do it. The Pāli texts 
repeatedly proclaim that a great person (mahāpurisa) has only two op-
tions: to be a cakravartin, or to be a buddha.11 Several texts praise the 
buddhas for declining the former option and selecting the latter. They 
have the option of not merely improving, but effectively perfecting, so-
ciety—and they decline it.  
  The Mahāpadāna Sutta (DN II.16-30) tells the story of Vipassī, a 
prince of an age long before ours. A prophecy informed Vipassī’s father, 
the king, that only two options were open to his son: to become either a 
cakravartin or a buddha. The king was excited that his son could make 
the kingdom flourish and afraid that the son would leave him to be a 
monk, so he built luxurious palaces full of sensual pleasures to keep 
Vipassī around, hooked on the delights kingship had to offer. But soon 
                                                        
11 DN I.88-9, for one example. 
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enough the prince left the palace to see the outside world, and saw what 
later tradition would immortalize as the “Four Sights.” That is, he saw an 
old man, a sick man, and a dead man, and realized that all these fates 
awaited him in the end, even as a king. On his fourth trip out, he saw a 
monk. He immediately recognized the monk’s path as a better one, a way 
beyond the clinging that characterizes the ruler’s life, and he explicitly 
chose that life as one better than political rulership. 
 Later sources tell a similar story about Siddhārtha or Gotama 
Buddha, the buddha of our age. Aśvaghoṣa makes it the central drama in 
his story of the Buddha’s life. First Siddhārtha’s father, the king, tells him 
that his dharma, his duty, is to remain in the family and be a king (BC 
V.32); then the family priest (purohita) tells him to abandon his idea of 
monkhood for the sake of dharma (dharmārtham) (BC IX.15). But the 
Buddha-to-be rejects their claims in both cases, specifically responding 
by saying “a kingdom thus provides neither dharma nor joy” (BC IX.42). 
We might think that the king’s main reason for telling his son to be a 
king was his familial love rather than a desire to make the kingdom 
prosper, but later in the text the Buddha-to-be encounters a different 
king (Śreṇya, the king of Rājagṛha12) who offers his own kingdom if the 
hero will not accept his father’s. He pleads for Siddhārtha to become 
king because he will create great prosperity: “association with the virtu-
ous makes the virtuous prosper” (BC X.26). But Siddhārtha turns Śreṇya 
down too.  
 The Rajja Sutta13 (SN I.116-117) goes yet further. Here, even to rule 
according to dharma (dhammena) is presented to the Buddha as a tempta-
tion from Māra, the evil tempter figure. As the Buddha comes closer to 
                                                        
12 Known as Seniya Bimbisāra in Pāli texts. 
13 I found the Rajja, Gilāna, and Tiracchāna Kathā Suttas through the thoughtful work of 
Matthew Moore. 
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awakening, he wonders: “Is it possible to exercise rulership righteously 
[dhammena]: without killing and without instigating others to kill, with-
out confiscating and without instigating others to confiscate, without 
sorrowing and without causing sorrow?” Māra replies that he can and 
should indeed rule righteously. But the Buddha, of course, refuses this 
temptation, and proceeds instead on the monastic path.  
 Classical Buddhists texts do not merely claim that buddhahood is 
such a lofty goal that it exceeds the goods a cakravartin could provide, or 
that only a monk should reject the path of the ruler. In the Gilāna Sutta 
(SN IV.302-304), the highly regarded householder disciple Citta is sick 
and about to die, and the gods ask him to vow that he will become a 
cakravartin. But he turns them down, saying: “That too is impermanent; 
that too is unstable; one must abandon that too and pass on.” Citta is not 
a bodhisattva or aspiring to be a buddha; he is simply aiming at arhat-
ship, the lower kind of awakening possible for a normal person. But even 
that is a greater goal than being a ruler who will bring general prosperi-
ty and flourishing to his society.  
 Nor is it merely rulership per se that the texts reject. The Tirac-
chāna Kathā Sutta rejects even talking about social problems and institu-
tions: “Do not engage in the various kinds of pointless talk: that is, talk 
about kings, thieves, and ministers of state; talk about armies, dangers 
and wars . . . talk about relations, vehicles, villages, towns, cities, and 
countries . . . .” (SN V.419) 
 So far, I have cited only mainstream (non-Mahāyāna) texts. One 
might imagine that the thoroughgoing altruism of the Mahāyāna would 
demand political engagement for the benefit of the world. But Śāntideva, 
one of the greatest Mahāyāna ethical thinkers, lists learning about law 
and politics (daṇḍanīti śāstra) among the kinds of learning that are fruit-
less, against liberation, and leading to delusion, which should therefore 
be avoided by bodhisattvas (ŚS 192). When he offers advice to kings, the 
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advice is that they give their kingdoms away (ŚS 27). Nor does the allevi-
ation of poverty take high priority in his work, as he asks: “If the perfec-
tion of generosity consists in making the universe free from poverty, 
how can previous Protectors [buddhas] have acquired it, when the world 
is still poor, even today?” (BCA V.9). Candrakīrti, too, quotes and com-
ments approvingly on a verse that a “sensible person does not acquire a 
kingdom” (CŚ IV.13).  
 It should be clear, then, that a wide range of classical Indian Bud-
dhist texts look with suspicion on, or even actively reject, engagement 
with social and political problems. The next three sections will explain 
their reasons for doing so.  
 
Arguments Against Engagement: Where Does Suffering Come From? 
Why do many Indian Buddhist texts reject engagement? First, they reject 
the idea that social problems such as war or poverty are significant caus-
es of suffering (dukkha), when that suffering is properly understood. The 
Second Noble Truth states that the origin of suffering is craving; disen-
gaged texts typically agree that the causes of suffering are primarily or 
entirely within the sufferer’s mind. To the extent that these texts identi-
fy causes of suffering beyond the sufferer’s mind, they are inevitabilities 
of life from which no amount of privilege will allow escape, such as old 
age, illness, and death. For that reason, they claim, attention to social 
problems is a distraction at best. So, the Tiracchāna Kathā Sutta explains 
why one should abstain from talk of society and its problems: “Because, 
monks, this talk is unbeneficial, irrelevant to the fundamentals of the 
holy life, and does not lead to revulsion, to dispassion, to cessation, to 
peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna” (SN V.420). 
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 For Aśvaghoṣa, when Siddhārtha’s father begs him not to become 
a monk, he says that he will agree on four conditions: “My life shall nev-
er be subject to death, disease shall not steal this good health of mine, 
old age shall never overtake my youth, no mishap shall rob this fortune 
of mine.” Of course, the king cannot make such a guarantee, and he al-
lows his son to leave. Becoming a ruler will not help Siddhārtha fix the 
real problems of life (BC V.32-35).  
 In the Rajja Sutta, Māra notes the Buddha is so powerful he could 
create great prosperity, sufficient to turn the Himalayas to gold. But the 
Buddha refuses, noting that any wealth always leaves one wanting more: 
“If there were a mountain made of gold, Made entirely of solid gold, Not 
double this would suffice for one . . .” (SN I.116-117). 
 Śāntideva, as is well known, takes the well-being of others as his 
first priority. That he is an altruistic thinker, concerned with others’ 
well-being, is not in dispute. And yet, as we saw clearly in the previous 
section, he still explicitly rejects social and political engagement. Why? 
Because that social engagement does not actually remedy the real causes 
of suffering. For him as for the non-Mahāyāna thinkers, the real causes 
of suffering are mental: “all fears and immeasurable sufferings arise 
from the mind alone” (BCA V.6). Furthermore, the things of this world 
are unworthy of our attention because they are metaphysically empty. 
(See Lele “Metaphysical” 273-277.) They will not get us out of suffering; 
they may even trap us there further. (See Lele, “Revaluation” 98-100 and 
124-28 for a detailed discussion of Śāntideva’s reasoning.)  
 For Śāntideva, as a consequence of all these points, the way one 
can best benefit others is to help them learn to follow the bodhisattva 
path, not to alleviate any social problems they might be facing. Jenkins 
disputes this interpretation of Śāntideva, noting correctly that on occa-
sion Śāntideva does say the bodhisattva gives to the poor (ŚS 274, for ex-
ample). But as I have argued elsewhere (Lele, “The Compassionate”), for 
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Śāntideva the primary purpose of the bodhisattva’s compassionate gift-
giving is to make the recipient better disposed to receive the teaching.14 
The bodhisattva gives to the rich as well as the poor; the recipient, rich 
or poor, receives no real material benefit from the gift.  
 It is a common mistake in discussions of Mahāyāna to miss this 
point: they assume that Śāntideva’s concern for others must necessarily 
imply social or political engagement, even though (as we saw in the pre-
vious section) he explicitly rejects it on multiple occasions. So, while 
King is correct to note that Śāntideva’s meditations on self and other are 
designed to lead us to compassionate action, she is wrong to equate com-
passionate action with social action (“Social Engagement,” 164). And 
while Macy is correct, strictly speaking, to say that Śāntideva “saw ser-
vice to others as the path leading to enlightenment,” she is not correct 
to identify that service with social service, or to segue as she does into 
the Sri Lankan reformer A. T. Ariyaratne and his movement to build “re-
paired roads, de-silted irrigation canals, nutrition programs, and 
schools” (Macy 174-175). For Śāntideva, such an approach does not pro-
vide the benefits that people really need. To Macy he might reply: “Our 
duty to others is to save them from the suffering their own cravings in-
flict on themselves. It helps to give them material goods, but not because 
possessing the goods helps prevent their suffering; instead because the 
                                                        
14 Śāntideva also recognizes another purpose of gift-giving which is not directly con-
necetd to compassion, and that is giving for one’s own spiritual benefit. This is especial-
ly the case for pariṇāmanā, the redirection of good karma, which is the context in which 
Śāntideva makes many of his wishes for the well-being of the poor and sick. In this case, 
too, material benefit to the recipient is irrelevant. See Lele, “Compassionate” 716, and 
“Revaluation” 167-169. 
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goods allow them to listen to the message that wealth and poverty are 
not what really matters.”15 
 
The Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta: Detachment from the Passage of Time 
The Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta (Discourse on the Lion’s Roar of the Cakravar-
tin) makes for a particularly helpful case study in disengaged Buddhism 
because engaged Buddhist scholars often take it as a key text advocating 
the reform and uplift of society. A reading of the discourse in context, 
however, shows that it actually advocates social disengagement. This 
sutta begins with the Buddha exhorting monks as follows:  
Monks, be islands unto yourselves, be a refuge unto your-
selves with no other refuge. Let the Dhamma be your is-
land, let the Dhamma be your refuge, with no other ref-
uge . . . . Keep to your own preserves, monks, to your an-
cestral haunts. If you do so, then Māra will find no lodge-
ment, no foothold. It is just by the building-up of whole-
some states that this merit increases. (DN III.58)  
 The Buddha adds that one can put this advice into practice by 
mindfully contemplating body, mind, feelings and dhammas. He then 
tells a story that extends from the past into the future, which takes up 
the bulk of the text. 
 The story goes as follows. Once upon a time, the Buddha says, a 
cakravartin ruled a flourishing kingdom where people lived for eighty 
thousand years. His descendant mostly ruled well but neglected to give 
                                                        
15 I develop this interpretation in more detail with additional references to the text in 
Lele, “Compassionate.” 
262 Lele, Disengaged Buddhism 
 
to the needy, so the kingdom became poorer, and criminal violence en-
sued. Once the decline began, the sutta continues, people began to take 
worse and worse actions, and as they did so, lives got worse and lifespans 
continued to decrease further (typically by about half each time), until 
“the children of those whose life-span had been two and a half centuries 
lived for only a hundred years” (DN III.59-71). 
 At this point the story’s past tense gives way to the future: 
“Monks, a time will come when the children of these people will have a 
life-span of ten years.” This future time is dystopian in multiple ways: 
families will be torn apart by hatred, even murder; even food with tasty 
flavours will disappear. But one desperate group of people will come to-
gether and say “It is only because we became addicted to evil ways that 
we suffered this loss of our kindred, so let us now do good! What good 
things can we do? Let us abstain from the taking of life—that will be a 
good practice” (DN III.73). This abstinence will start to give them a more 
beautiful appearance; lifespans will soon increase back to twenty years. 
So the group will learn to refrain from other sorts of bad actions. As a 
result, lifespans will continue to move back upward until they again 
reach eighty thousand years and a new cakravartin will arise, as will the 
future buddha Metteyya (Maitreya).  
 From that point the text returns to the original frame, exhorting 
the monks to “be islands unto yourselves, be a refuge unto yourselves, 
with no other refuge,” to enter states of meditative concentration 
(jhāna), and to take the dhamma as their refuge (DN III.73-79). 
 Some readers have perceived a tension between the embedded 
past-future narrative and the solitary exhortations that frame it at the 
beginning and end. Mavis Fenn, for example, claims that “the effect of 
the frame tale on the embedded story is to undermine the strong socio-
political thrust of the embedded story” (104). Richard Gombrich goes 
considerably further, proclaiming that  
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the myth is set in an inappropriate frame. Most of the 
Buddha’s sermons are presented as preached in answer to 
a question or in some other appropriate context; but this 
one has a beginning and an ending in which the Buddha is 
talking to monks about something totally different. Either 
the whole text is apocryphal or at least it has been tam-
pered with. (85-86) 
 It is noteworthy that Gombrich says nothing about what is actual-
ly in the beginning and ending—namely the exhortations to be islands 
unto themselves and take the dharma as their refuge—nor why he takes 
them to be “totally different.” Perhaps he is agreeing with Fenn and Jen-
kins that the embedded story has a “strong socio-political thrust” (as the 
frame story does not). But does it?  
 Steven Collins provides a reading of the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda that 
does far more justice to the text’s features. Collins notes that there are 
several phrasings that occur in both the frame story and the embedded 
story, suggesting the same author was at work in both. We cannot know 
for sure whether the Cakkavatti is a composite text or not, but even if it 
were a composite text, there was a redactor who tried to give it unity, 
and it is that redactor’s version that we have. So, we have textual reason 
to attempt to read the story as a consistent work (Nirvana 491-492). For 
his part, Gombrich recognizes “The Theravādin tradition itself, however, 
does not doubt that the text is authentic . . .” (85-86). 
 Collins argues that the purpose of the whole Cakkavatti is “to in-
duce in its audiences—or at least to make possible as a reaction from some 
among them—a sense of detachment from, or at least a (briefly) non-
involved perspective on the passage of time.” The embedded story gives 
“narrative form” to a “sense of the futility of temporal goods . . .” (Nirvana 
481). That is, the embedded story—taken as a whole, rather than taking 
the passage about poverty and crime in isolation—serves to show that 
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good and bad social systems will come and go, and they will get worse 
before they get better. So the narrative provides a reason why the text’s 
audience should build personal virtue and embrace the dharma, rather 
than placing its hope in those social systems or any idea of progress 
therein.16 Read in this way, the message of the frame and embedded sto-
ries is entirely consistent—but to the extent that either can be seen as 
having a “strong socio-political thrust,” that thrust turns out to be a dis-
engagement from society and politics. 
 Earlier I noted Stephen Jenkins’s claim that the embedded story 
shows “Material well-being is a prerequisite for moral development, and 
its absence leads to social disaster.” He argues this because it is the king’s 
failure to provide for the poor that causes theft and creates the down-
ward cycle. But the later sections of the embedded story themselves 
show that material well-being is not a prerequisite for moral develop-
ment: beings come together and improve themselves by learning to re-
frain from bad actions amid fantastically bad material conditions. Ra-
ther, that moral improvement is what ultimately makes the material 
conditions better. The frame story prepares the audience to be able to 
improve morally even in such a dire situation. To do so, the text says, 
audience members can and should disengage from society: keep to their 
own preserves, be islands unto themselves. Then they will no longer be 
dependent on social conditions for their well-being.  
 When placed in the context of this sutta, the aforementioned 
prophecy that a buddha can choose to be a cakravartin, but does not do 
so, is particularly striking. If the Buddha of our era had decided to be-
                                                        
16 I suspect it is significant that this text only says to take refuge in the dharma, where 
more common formulations of refuge-taking include the Buddha and saṅgha (monk-
hood) as well. In the envisioned future of ten-year lifespans, there may well be no ex-
tant buddha or saṅgha to which one can turn.  
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come a cakravartin instead of a buddha, he could have stopped the down-
ward spiral and taken us to a better era. But he did not do so. Finding the 
path to liberation was so important that it was worth allowing the disas-
trous future where lifespans are a mere ten years. 
 
Arguments Against Engagement: The Harshness of Politics 
Let us turn now to politics and government, an area that, as we saw, 
plays a major role in engaged Buddhists’ engagement. Many classical In-
dian Buddhist texts reject the activity of governing because they view it 
as inimical to advancement on the Buddhist path because of the kinds of 
acts and mental states that governing requires. This is not to say the 
texts are anarchistic. Governing is a necessary evil—but it is no less evil 
for being necessary. One will be better off, progress further on the path, 
if one can avoid engaging in the processes of government.  
 The Aggañña Sutta’s brief section on the kingly (khattiya, equiva-
lent to kṣatriya) caste has become renowned for expressing a “social con-
tract” theory of government. (See Collins, “Discourse” 387-389.) That is, 
once people first begin to steal and do other bad things, other people de-
cide together that if someone takes on the job of punishing these wrong-
doers, they will reward him with a portion of rice, and the sutta presents 
this as the origin of government.17 What is less frequently noted is that 
the text explicitly proclaims that accusation, punishment, and banish-
ment are bad (pāpaka, akusala), just as the original thefts are (DN III.93). 
Their role in maintaining society does not stop them from creating bad 
karma and interfering with one’s progress to nirvana.  
                                                        
17 Candrakīrti’s Catuḥśatakaṭīkā, which we will examine shortly, repeats this story.  
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 Likewise, in the Mūgapakkha Jātaka, the Bodhisatta (buddha-to-
be)18 is born as a prince whose father rules according to dharma (dham-
mena). Yet even so, when the Bodhisatta sees his father punishing crimi-
nals, he thinks: “Ah! my father through his being a king, is becoming guilty 
of a grievous action which brings men to hell” (Ja VI.3, emphasis added). 
So, the prince pretends to be deaf and mute in order to get out of the 
burden of rulership—so concerned to avoid it that he resorts to decep-
tion. 
 Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita makes this point as well. The family 
priest (purohita) tells Siddhārtha that he will fulfill dharma better as a 
king than a renouncer (BC IX.15-17). Siddhārtha responds that kingship 
is dangerous and interferes with liberation because of the harshness or 
fierceness (taikṣṇya) that it requires: 
As for the scripture that householder kings have attained 
release, that cannot be! The dharma of release [mokṣa-
dharma], where calm prevails, and the dharma of kings 
[rājadharma], where force prevails—how far apart are 
they!19 If a king delights in calm, his realm [rājya] falls 
apart, if his mind is on his realm, his calm is destroyed; for 
calmness and fierceness [taikṣṇya] are incompatible, like 
the union of fire and water, heat and cold. (BC IX.48-50) 
 Notice here the dramatic contrast to the claim of Yarnall’s tradi-
tionists, noted earlier, that “Buddhists have never accepted a dualistic 
                                                        
18 Pāli bodhisatta becomes bodhisattva in Sanskrit. In the jātakas this term simply refers 
to the Buddha of our age, in his previous lives before he became the Buddha.  
19 The contrast between rājadharma and mokṣadharma echoes the names of the sections 
of the Śāntiparvan, the longest book of the Mahābhārata; the rājadharma section articu-
lates a theory of rulership. See Hiltebeitel for a broader discussion of the ways in which 
the Buddhacarita critiques the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana. 
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split between ‘spiritual’ and ‘social’ domains.” In the Buddhacarita, a ma-
jor Buddhist author not only makes an explicit distinction between the 
domains of mokṣa and of rājya, he claims that the mental states they in-
volve are incompatible. Perhaps there were some classical Buddhists who 
did not accept such a split, but Aśvaghoṣa was not among them. So, like-
wise, the idea of engagement as a duty is explicitly rejected: the kings 
tell the buddha-to-be that dharma requires his political involvement, 
and he says no. Indeed, the higher Buddhist dharma of liberation re-
quires the exact opposite.  
 These are mainstream (non-Mahāyāna) thinkers. One might think 
that since governing produces a more functional society, the more altru-
istic Mahāyāna thinkers might see governing as a necessary self-
sacrifice, such that the ruler should sacrifice his own well-being for the 
sake of a better society. But this is not the case.  
 We saw earlier how Candrakīrti says a sensible person does not 
become a king. For Candrakīrti, the most important reason for this deci-
sion is the harshness in which a king must engage to maintain order: “he 
cannot reign without oppressing the people” (commentary on CŚ IV.24). 
For him, that punishment is a necessary evil does not make it any less of 
an evil. Introducing CŚ IV.10, he entertains the objection that “If the king 
punishes evil people in order to protect his people, he accumulates no 
bad karma [sdig pa]20 because he benefits the good people.” The objector 
wants to make the utilitarian claim that the net benefit of punishment 
makes it a karmically good act. But to this objection Candrakīrti says no:  
                                                        
20 Lang’s translation renders the Tibetan sdig pa—which would have been pāpa in Can-
drakīrti’s lost original Sanskrit—as “harm.” I have changed her translation here to ren-
der it as the more literal “bad karma” (and the adjective as “karmically bad” rather 
than “harmful”), to highlight that Candrakīrti views the ruler’s acts as morally, and not 
merely psychologically, problematic. See Lele “Ethical Revaluation” 71-73 for a more 
general defence of the translation of pāpa as “bad karma.” 
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The king believes that punishment is his job and that 
there is nothing nonvirtuous about it. In this way, reasons 
that are satisfying are created. But the bad karma of these 
actions is not destroyed. It is just the same for the king. 
Since the king mostly engages in karmically bad actions, 
he will experience the maturation of that bad karma in 
bad rebirths.  
 
Western Engaged Buddhist Presuppositions 
The disengaged Buddhist texts we have considered—the Mūgapakkha 
Jātaka, the works of Aśvaghoṣa, Śāntideva and Candrakīrti, and various 
Pāli suttas—are at odds with claims of both “traditionist” and “modern-
ist” engaged Buddhists. Against the traditionists, we have seen that 
South Asian Buddhists not only made an explicit separation between lib-
eration and socio-political domains but thought that the two were in di-
rect opposition to each other. Against modernists we have seen that, far 
from constituting a “failure” or a lack of development, these Buddhists 
had plausible, considered reasons to oppose social and political engage-
ment. The texts in question are hardly obscure; the Ten Great Jātakas 
and the works of Śāntideva are among the most beloved works in con-
temporary Theravāda and Tibetan traditions respectively. The wide-
spread nature of disengaged Buddhism in classical South Asia should 
have been easy to see.  
 Yet somehow many Western engaged Buddhist scholars have, 
indeed, failed to see it. This failure is despite the fact that some Western 
scholars have observed Buddhist anti-political tendencies for a long 
time. While Max Weber’s (206) depiction of Buddhism as a “specifically 
unpolitical and anti-political status religion” was in important respects 
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exaggerated, it captures the ideas we have encountered here far better 
than many engaged Buddhist scholars have.  
 Sometimes disengaged Buddhism is not even unseen so much as 
intentionally ignored. Consider Judith Simmer-Brown’s description of 
the group that would become the Buddhist Peace Fellowship. The impli-
cations of this passage are striking enough to merit a close reading. 
Simmer-Brown says this group  
was concerned that Buddhist practice centers and groups 
had become entirely removed from the social and political 
issues of the day: some teachers and organizations were 
even actively discouraging political involvement. The 
Maui group envisioned an organization which would at-
tract a wide range of Buddhists, fomenting political dis-
cussion and action. Something had to be done, and specif-
ically something political needed to be done by Buddhists. 
“Anyone, feeling compassion, seeing no boundary be-
tween self and others, would feel compelled to do some-
thing,” observed Nelson Foster, reflecting on the occasion. 
(69) 
 In this passage, Simmer-Brown describes the teachers’ discour-
agement of political involvement with “even,” strongly suggesting that 
she finds this discouragement surprising, unexpected, or extreme. Does 
Simmer-Brown then react as one would expect a scholar would react to a 
surprising or unexpected development, by probing further and explor-
ing the reasons for it? No. Simmer-Brown does not deem the teachers’ 
objections relevant enough to be worthy of any recognition, regard, or 
consideration beyond this half-sentence. Nothing further is said about 
them, not even their names.  
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 Instead, Simmer-Brown proceeds with the story of what the 
group did in apparent defiance of its teachers, by saying something had 
to be done. This “had to” is a claim of normative necessity, like Kraft’s 
“We must be engaged.” As I’ve argued above, it is a good thing that en-
gaged Buddhist scholars make normative claims. However, they also 
need to justify them, and Simmer-Brown does nothing of the sort. The 
teachers, after all, were explicitly saying that something did not “have 
to” be done. If they were right, the claim that “Something had to be 
done”—a premise that underlies the laudatory tone of Simmer-Brown’s 
overall story—would therefore be wrong, and vice versa. So, from this 
passage I can only infer that she thinks it obvious that these teachers 
were wrong, and that she believes her audience will share this senti-
ment. She thinks, that is, that her audience will take it as obvious that 
this group “had to” disregard the advice of its own teachers, so much so 
that there is no need to discuss their reasons in a story constituted by 
the actions the group took in defiance of those teachers. The teachers’ 
voices are deemed irrelevant; only the defiance matters. Indeed, since 
those teachers apparently did not “feel compelled to do something,” 
Nelson Foster’s claim, approvingly quoted by Simmer-Brown, has the 
further eye-opening implication that the group’s own teachers were not 
feeling compassion. Yet even after implying this startling accusation 
against the group’s teachers, with no evidence provided for it, Simmer-
Brown still does not deem it relevant to give the teachers a voice or a 
chance to defend themselves against it.  
 This sort of neglect of disengaged Buddhism—an assumption that 
political disengagement is obviously bad—itself calls for explanation. A 
significant part of the problem is that engaged Buddhists have often 
been blind to their movement’s own history. Consider this additional 
claim of Foster’s: 
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I find no evidence that the emerging [engaged] culture of 
the American Zen sangha has been forced upon it as a 
protective adaptation to yet another foreign environ-
ment. Rather, the new forms seem to have taken root 
spontaneously, from within, as teachers and students 
found them helpful to express realization. After all, the 
values that have cropped up in the American sangha are 
hardly those that prevail in the population of the United 
States. (52) 
 This last sentence is deeply misleading. American engaged Bud-
dhists’ values may be at odds with those that prevail in Alabama or rural 
Michigan, but they are not easily distinguished from the values of their 
non-Buddhist fellows in Berkeley and Vermont and Boulder. Indeed, 
some of the characteristics Foster attributes to engaged Buddhists are 
stereotypically so, like “recycling, gardening, and organic farming” (52). 
Such values appear far closer to those of their non-Buddhist neighbors 
than they do to the values in the classical Buddhist texts we have consid-
ered.  
 Foster’s earlier sentences are more misleading still. Far from hav-
ing “taken root spontaneously,” the values of American engaged Bud-
dhism are fully contiguous with the early reception of Buddhism in the 
United States. In documenting that early reception, Thomas Tweed has 
noted the remarkable degree of normative agreement between American 
Buddhist apologists and their (typically Christian) critics on one key 
point. That is: “Whether there is a personal creator or a substantial 
self . . . there still must be optimism and activism” (155, emphasis in orig-
inal). Notice the exact parallel with Kenneth Kraft’s contemporary claim 
that “we must be engaged.”  
 Americans and Englishmen of the late nineteenth century shared 
a great suspicion of Buddhism for its perceived lack of social engage-
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ment. Charles Henry Appleton Dall, a Unitarian missionary to India, pro-
claimed that Buddhism is to be judged by its contributions to society: 
“What Buddhism has accomplished in the world, that it is.” Dall found it 
lacking because of its emphasis on renunciation, which left it unable to 
generate the requisite “energy”21 for worldly accomplishment, such that 
“the properly Buddhist nations of the world are all asleep” (quoted in 
Tweed 144). Henry Melville King, on the executive committee of the 
American Baptist Missionary Union, claimed that Buddhism promotes a 
way of life in which the individual is “wholly idle, and to all besides him-
self absolutely useless” (quoted in Tweed 145). And in the Atlantic in 
1894, the mainline Protestant writer William Davies wrote:  
If we make a comparison of Buddhism and Christianity, 
however great a similarity may appear in some of the el-
ements of its teaching, its distinct inferiority in scope, 
purpose, and adaptability will become apparent. The reli-
gion of the Buddha could never be brought to combine 
with the advancement and progressive amelioration of 
society. It works by abandonment, leaving the world eve-
ry way as it finds it. It lacks the helpful and actively loving 
spirit of Christianity. (quoted in Tweed 145) 
 Such views took on a particular poignancy in a colonial context, 
when Buddhists’ Western political rulers took their subjects’ social dis-
engagement as grounds for discouraging Buddhism in favor of an alien 
tradition. George Bond (124) notes that British officials and Christian 
missionaries took Buddhism’s “other-worldly” nature “as an argument 
for promoting Christianity and Christian schools. Since Christianity was 
                                                        
21 Recall how both Tweed’s definition of activism and Queen’s definition of engaged 
Buddhism, quoted above, include the word “energetic” as a key component.  
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identified with Western culture and knowledge, the British praised it as 
progressive and condemned Buddhism as backward.”22 
 It was this context that formed the background for the newfound 
activism of Anagarika Dharmapala, the Sinhalese reformer in whom 
Queen (20) says we “first recognize the spirit and substance of the reli-
gious activism we call ‘socially engaged Buddhism,’” and whose message, 
as Bond notes, “profoundly influenced later Buddhist reformers” like A. 
T. Ariyaratne, the Gandhian sarvodaya social reformer often taken as an 
inspiration by Western engaged Buddhists. Dharmapala “stressed ‘the 
constructive optimism’ and fundamental ‘activism’ of authentic Bud-
dhism. ‘Buddhism’, he claimed, ‘teaches an energetic life, to be active in 
doing good work all the time’” (Tweed 148). Bond agrees that in “advo-
cating a Buddhism of activity and service, Dharmapala was undoubtedly 
responding to the Western and Christian criticism of Buddhism as too 
other-worldly”; Dharmapala agreed with his colonial rulers in referring 
to Sri Lankan monks as “‘indolent’” (124). 
                                                        
22 Christians’ project of denigrating Buddhists for their lack of activism also continues 
into the present day, though the more liberal among them no longer think of this pro-
ject in terms of Christian anti-Buddhist apologetics. For example, when the contempo-
rary Christian Reverend Joseph Cheah interviews several Burmese Buddhists about 
their experiences of racism, they tell him that those experiences were not really im-
portant to them and not worth complaining about, in ways that Aśvaghoṣa and Śān-
tideva would likely have approved. But rather than respecting his marginalized Bud-
dhist subjects’ voices as something from which he might have something to learn, Fr. 
Cheah, just like his Christian predecessors in the colonial era, instead chides them for 
their lack of activism: he claims that in their rejection of activism they have “internal-
ized the neoconservative stereotype of Asian Americans as the model minority,” an 
“internalization of the prevailing ideology of white supremacy” (Cheah 90-1). Given 
that Fr. Cheah’s work claims to be deeply concerned with historicizing, it is striking 
how little he thinks to historicize his own insistence on political activism—or perhaps 
not so striking, given how much Christians and other Westerners have taken activism 
for granted (as we see elsewhere in this section).  
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 Dharmapala made these criticisms as what Yarnall would call a 
traditionist, writing Buddhist activism back into the past. He claimed his 
“‘indolent’” contemporaries had “‘lost the spirit of heroism and altruism 
of their ancient examples’” (quoted in Bond 124). H. L. Seneviratne (31-
32) claims that Dharmapala agreed with the criticisms “that Buddhism is 
other-worldly and provides no basis for a progressive society, that Bud-
dhism is selfish, and that the Sinhalas are lazy”—but also believed that 
these criticisms were true “only of the modern-day Sinhalas, not the 
true Sinhalas of old.”  
 Views like those of Dall, King, Davies and the British rulers of Sri 
Lanka remain alive and well in the modern West. And they continue to 
form the present background to contemporary engaged Buddhism, just 
as they did to the incipient engaged Buddhism of Dharmapala. Stephen 
Batchelor notes:  
Most Buddhist practitioners have been asked at one time 
or another—”Why do you go off on these retreats? Isn’t it 
selfish? Why don’t you go out and do something useful in 
the world?” Engaged Buddhism is, in a way, counter to 
that objection. (quoted in Bell 414) 
 Such questions echo the critiques of previous generations of 
Western anti-Buddhist critics, and engaged Buddhism is a product of 
that context. Batchelor responds as follows:  
The question is what motivates a person to adopt engaged 
Buddhism? Is it because they feel they have to somehow 
justify themselves in the light of Western criticism of 
Buddhism? Or is it a spontaneous and genuine outflow of 
their Buddhist practice? (quoted in Bell 414) 
 I submit that the emphasis on “spontaneity,” here as in Foster, is 
misplaced, at least insofar as it implies a personal attitude independent 
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of historical context. Engaged Buddhism in the West is the product of a 
long Western history of assuming that activism is a good thing and even 
an obligation. Western engaged Buddhist scholars, of both “traditionist” 
and “modernist” varieties, share more in common with the early West-
ern anti-Buddhist critics described above than they might like to think. 
For clarity, we may phrase those critics’ argument as a deductive cate-
gorical syllogism:  
1. Not to engage in social activism is to be deficient. 
2. The tradition of premodern Buddhism generally does not 
engage in social activism. 
3. Therefore, the tradition of premodern Buddhism is generally 
deficient. 
This syllogism is valid: if premises 1 and 2 are true, then conclu-
sion 3 must be as well. Naturally, Buddhists will aim to avoid the implica-
tion that Buddhism as such is inferior. Traditionists attempt to avoid 
that implication by rejecting premise 2, in ways that (as we have seen 
above) typically do interpretive injustice to a significant portion of pre-
modern Indian Buddhist tradition. Modernists reluctantly accept the 
whole syllogism, instead aiming to build a newer, modern Buddhism 
about which premise 2 ceases to be true.  
 But the traditionists and the modernists share something not on-
ly with each other, but also with Dall, King, Davies and the colonial rulers 
of Sri Lanka. That is, they all share an endorsement (even if only implic-
it) of premise 1: there must be something wrong with a tradition that is 
not activist. To refrain from activism and political involvement would be 
“selfish” or “indolent,” not “useful.” We must be engaged.  
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 It is that premise, so widely shared among pro-Buddhist and anti-
Buddhist Westerners alike, that the disengaged Buddhists reject. But the 
premise is taken so much for granted among Westerners that they often 
refuse to take its rejection seriously, choosing instead to ignore or si-
lence its rejectors. This refusal has existed for a long time; Tweed “found 
no evidence that any midcentury American who encountered the chal-
lenge of Buddhist negation seriously considered abandoning Victorian 
presuppositions,” including the presupposition that activism is neces-
sary (Tweed 13).  
 Viewed in this light, Yarnall’s militant criticism of “modernist” 
engaged representations of traditional Buddhism takes on a very differ-
ent cast. Because modernists treat engaged Buddhism as a new im-
provement on an Asian failure or vacuum—the approach we have seen in 
Tanabe and Snyder—Yarnall accuses them of “a subtle form of neocolo-
nial, neo-Orientalist bias” (Yarnall 6). But Yarnall’s grounds for this criti-
cism turn out to apply to his own “traditionist” work at least as much as 
to theirs.  
 Adapting criticisms of Carl Jung made by Donald Lopez and Luis 
Gómez, Yarnall claims the modernists create a “neo-colonial economy” 
because they “judge the raw materials of Buddhism to be valuable, but 
unusable and even dangerous (or irrelevant) to the modern Westerner in 
their unrefined form” (Yarnall 33). As his preferred alternative, Yarnall 
approvingly quotes David Seyfort Ruegg on the need for an analysis that 
“will not superimpose from the outside extraneous modes of thinking 
and interpretive grids in a way that sometimes proves to be scarcely dis-
tinguishable from a more or less subtle form of neo-colonialism” (Yarnall 
76-77). 
 But elsewhere in his piece, to “superimpose from the outside ex-
traneous modes of thinking and interpretive grids” is exactly the agenda 
that Yarnall calls for. To wit, “Interested scholars (both traditionists as 
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well as open-minded modernists) should now revisit the history of pre-
modern Buddhist Asia with the express purpose of discovering examples of en-
gagement as defined (more or less) by Queen and/or other modernists” (Yarnall 
71, emphasis added). That is, he takes a mode of thinking defined in the 
terms of modernists extraneous to premodern Buddhist Asia, and urges 
that scholars superimpose that very extraneous mode of thinking on the 
history of premodern Buddhist Asia when they revisit it. Moreover, he 
makes both this call and this accusation of neo-colonialism with no more 
than one passing parenthetical reference to any premodern text.23 We 
should, it would seem, read our own modern Western preferences for 
social activism and engagement onto premodern Buddhist texts from the 
outside, irrespective of anything those texts actually happen to say. We 
can’t allow those texts to advocate political disengagement, because then 
they would be unusable, and even dangerous or irrelevant. Our extrane-
ous mode of thinking and interpretive grid tells us so.  
 Yarnall, then, apparently misses the irony that he advocates ex-
actly that mode of analysis which he himself has labelled “scarcely dis-
tinguishable from a more or less subtle form of neo-colonialism.” I want 
to emphasize here that I do not myself think that Yarnall’s project, or 
that of any other engaged Buddhist, is in any way a form of neo-
colonialism, subtle or otherwise. I take neo-colonialism to be a serious 
accusation, and one uncalled for by the evidence at hand. As Gadamer 
reminds us, we all come to inquiry with a set of preexisting presupposi-
tions of some sort or another; that Western engaged Buddhist scholars’ 
                                                        
23 That one is a mid-sentence reference to “the scriptural ‘evidence’ that the tradition-
ists cite (Nāgārjuna’s Jewel Garland; Aśoka’s edicts; the Cakkavati- [sic], Kūṭadanta- and 
Sigālovāda-suttas, and so forth) . . .” (Yarnall 22). I have already shown in some detail 
how one of these texts, the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sutta, is not the engaged text that the 
traditionists think it is.  
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endorsement of activism is Western in origin by no means makes it 
wrong. One can be justified in one’s views while acknowledging their his-
torical roots; a view does not need to be a “spontaneous” historical 
anomaly for it to be justified.   
 Rather, I dwell on Yarnall’s accusation of neo-colonialism only 
because it makes so visible the lack of self-scrutiny among too many en-
gaged Buddhists to date (a lack that an insistence on spontaneity tends 
to worsen). Yarnall’s article never once considers as a possibility the 
idea, so widespread in premodern Indian Buddhist texts yet so rarely ex-
pressed in the West, that social or political engagement might be a bad 
thing. Instead he follows the longstanding tradition, with its deep roots 
in the West, of assuming activism is a good and taking that good for 
granted; as a result, he assumes that to describe premodern Buddhism as 
disengaged must be to criticize it. In that lack of introspection his article 
is typical of the present Western engaged Buddhist literature—and be-
cause of it, he inadvertently accuses himself of neo-colonialism! 
 
Responses to Disengaged Buddhism 
It is rare for Western engaged Buddhist scholars to acknowledge that 
disengaged Buddhists have reasons and arguments for disengagement. 
But the arguments of disengaged Buddhists have not gone entirely unno-
ticed by Western engaged Buddhist writers. Hsiao-Lan Hu and Sallie 
King, in particular, pay them some attention, but not enough. For they do 
not address the arguments made in the historical sections of this article, 
as made either by the thinkers I have quoted or by anyone else.  
 Hu’s This-Worldly Buddhism is one of the more systematic expres-
sions to date of an engaged Buddhist ethic. Hu shows admirable clarity 
about engaging in normative ethics—acknowledging that “I am joining 
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those who engage in critical and constructive Buddhist thinking” (Hu 5). 
She justifies her points with detailed references to the Pāli suttas, espe-
cially the Saṃyutta and Majjhima Nikāyas. Yet the disengaged Rajja, Gilāna, 
and Tiracchāna Kathā Suttas, which are all in the Saṃyutta, get no mention 
in the book. The Cakkavatti Sīhanāda appears only for the brief portion of 
the story where the king’s inattention to poverty causes decline, and not 
for any of the story’s wider advocacy of disengagement. She cites the Ag-
gañña approvingly on greed creating a need for punishment (Hu 112), 
but does not mention the way the text treats punishment as bad.  
 Hu improves on most engaged Buddhist scholars by referring 
briefly to the arguments of Buddhists who have “not provided much di-
rect critique of existing social structure . . .” But the particular argu-
ments she mentions only justify those social structures in terms of past 
karma (Hu 120). She does not reply to the kinds of Buddhist arguments 
discussed in the previous sections, that the causes of suffering are men-
tal or that politics interferes with tranquility.  
 Neither does King. Possibly alone among Western engaged Bud-
dhist ethicists, she does refer directly, by name, to texts that appear to 
advocate disengagement, and cites their arguments, referring specifical-
ly to the Fire Sermon (Ādittapariyāya Sutta) and Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. She 
looks at these texts in order to examine “what is controversial about en-
gaged Buddhism,” and notes that “many Buddhists have taken teachings 
like this to mean that samsara is inherently flawed, that the correct re-
sponse toward it is to feel revulsion and to flee it if at all possible” (Social-
ly 40-45). 
 King’s response notes other texts, like the Mettā and Sigālovada 
Suttas, that do advocate living in the world of saṃsāra, and reads the Fire 
Sermon to note that its critique is really directed at the “three poisons” 
of craving, hatred, and delusion: 
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If these three poisons are indeed the root of the problem, 
then the problem is in our minds, not in the world. We can 
free ourselves of duḥkha by practicing Buddhism in such a 
way that we rid ourselves of this craving, hatred, and de-
lusion. This has nothing whatsoever to do with leaving 
the world and everything to do with transforming our-
selves, here and now. (Socially 43; emphasis in original) 
 King interprets this text correctly in this passage. Yet everything 
King says in this passage is compatible with the disengaged arguments made in 
previous sections of this article. If “the problem is in our minds, not in the 
world,” that is itself a reason why it is folly to seek the kinds of worldly 
goods that social activism can secure, rather than the more important 
goods of mental cultivation. It is also why one must avoid participation 
in the political action that is likely to increase the hatred (dveṣa or dosa) 
in our minds. Or so the texts claim, anyway, and to these points King has 
offered no refutation.  
 An alternate response to disengaged Buddhists comes from Mat-
thew Moore, who does not identify with engaged Buddhism and demon-
strates considerably more awareness of disengaged Buddhist views, 
which he cites extensively under the rubric of “limited citizenship” 
(Moore 87-111). He notes further how this “limited citizenship” ap-
proach contrasts with a Western tradition from Plato onward that as-
sumes the good life must be political: “It is virtually always true that the 
cure proposed for anomie, alienation, sectarian conflict, disempower-
ment, and other political ills is . . . more politics!” (Moore 136). But 
Moore’s normative response, too, is unsatisfactory, when he identifes 
this contrast as 
an irreconcilable conflict between value preferences. The 
pro-politics party argues that the virtues that can be cul-
tivated only through politics are more important than the 
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virtues that can be cultivated only by eschewing politics 
in favor of some other important pursuit like meditation, 
while the limited-citizenship party argues the opposite. 
Absent a noncontroversial rank ordering of the relevant 
moral values, there is no principled way to choose be-
tween the competing options, and neither choice can be 
shown to be universally morally preferable. (109-10) 
 Moore, then, presents engagement and disengagement as a 
choice between options, entirely up to the chooser. What is important to 
note about this approach is that it expresses a strong disagreement with 
the disengaged texts discussed above—and also, for that matter, with 
more politically engaged thinkers like Plato. The disengaged thinkers do 
indeed believe that the disengaged path is universally morally prefera-
ble, and they make arguments to show why this is the case; more politi-
cal thinkers do the opposite. Both engaged and disengaged thinkers be-
lieve they have provided a principled way to choose between the op-
tions, partially on the basis of a rank ordering of values. The ordering is 
controversial, of course, but so is the theory of evolution; the presence of 
controversy does not imply that both sides or both options are equally 
valuable.  
 There is no substitute for weighing the arguments on both sides 
and coming to a resolution—a task that is yet to be undertaken. Is it the 
case that the goods activism can provide are inherently unsatisfactory 
and therefore unworthy of our seeking, for ourselves and for others? If 
so, then social activism is indeed a worthless pastime, just as the disen-
gaged Budhists say it is, and the engaged Buddhists are sadly deluded, for 
they are leading themselves and others away from liberation. Is it the case 
that political participation necessarily makes it impossible to attain the 
tranquility that has been held throughout the ages as a central Buddhist 
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goal?24 If so, then Buddhists should not be politically engaged, and per-
haps nobody should. I am not endorsing either of these disengaged con-
clusions; I am arguing that Buddhists should take them, and the argu-
ments that lead to them, with the utmost seriousness, and that to date 
they have not.  
 
Conclusion 
Against traditionist engaged Buddhist scholars, we have seen that social 
and political disengagement has a long Buddhist history, one that ex-
tends to some of the texts the traditionists take as their sources. Against 
modernist scholars, we have seen that a thoughtful logic and reasoning 
underlies that disengagement: social and political problems are not the 
primary causes of suffering, so one is best served by detaching oneself 
from the passage of time, and participation in government fills one with 
harshness of mind. One may certainly disagree with the reasoning be-
hind a disengaged Buddhist position, but that position is not a “vacuum” 
or a “failure.”  
 It is not my aim to rule out either traditionist or modernist en-
gaged Buddhism as viable intellectual positions, but rather to argue that 
they must think differently than they typically have. Modernists must 
engage intellectually—no pun intended—with premodern disengaged 
Buddhism, in the details of its arguments, and articulate what it is they 
reject about its premises and why. If the traditionist project is to contin-
ue, traditionists must acknowledge the large number of premodern 
                                                        
24 There is a strong psychological element to these Buddhist claims, so psychological 
evidence is relevant to evaluating them. Such evidence is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle; I have provided a very preliminary discussion of it in Lele, “Psychological.” 
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works that are disengaged; they must not only identify engaged works 
that they find as a counter-current, but explain how they interpret the 
disengaged works in light of the engaged ones.  
 It should, I hope, be clear by now that it is not the case that all 
Buddhism is socially engaged. If one still wished to claim with Hunt-
Perry and Fine that what is not already engaged is not Buddhism, it 
would need to be as a normative claim—and that normative claim would 
exclude Aśvaghoṣa, Śāntideva, the author of the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda Sut-
ta, and many others as not true Buddhists. That claim is radical and dras-
tic, and one that I doubt Hunt-Perry and Fine, or others who quote them 
approvingly, would actually want to make.  
 If it is to remain an intellectually defensible project, I submit, en-
gaged Buddhism must take the value of activism as a conclusion to be 
defended, not as a premise to be assumed. Engaged Buddhists must rec-
ognize the ways in which the likes of Aśvaghoṣa and Śāntideva oppose 
politics and social activism, and explain why they reject these thinkers’ 
positions. It should no longer be considered acceptable either to pretend 
disengaged Buddhist views did not exist or to dismiss them as a “failure” 
or “undeveloped.” Rather, we must respect them and take them on as 
partners in dialogue. 
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